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A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the par-
titions of n pies. A seller (/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer
(/seller) on the division of a pie. The players bargain in a system like the stock
market: each seller(buyer) can either offer a selling(buying) price to all buy-
ers(sellers) or accept a price offered by another buyer(seller). The offered
prices are known to all. Once a player accepts a price offered by another
one, the division of a pie between them is determined. Each player has a con-
stant discounting factor and the discounting factors of all players are common
knowledge. In this article, we prove that the equilibrium of this bargaining
problem is a unanimous division rate for all players, which is equivalent to
Nash bargaining equilibrium of a two-player bargaining game in which the
discounting factors of two players are the average of n buyers and the average
of n sellers respectively. This result shows the relevance between bargaining
equilibrium and general equilibrium of markets.
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Introduction
Game theorists have developed the axiomatic approach and sequential approach for two-player
bargaining games. With a series of axiomatic assumptions, Nash has proved the unique equi-
librium of two-player bargaining games (Nash 1950). Rubinstein (1982) has developed the
sequential strategic approach in which two players take turns making alternating offers. In the
case where each player has a constant discounting factor (δ1 and δ2), the solution is proved to
be (1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2). Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinskyet (1986) discussed the relationship
between these two approaches.
For the bargaining problems with more than two players, the uniqueness of the perfect equi-
librium outcome does not hold even under the condition of common discounting factor (Sutton
1986; Herrero 1985; Haller 1986). This bargaining game is described as multiple players try-
ing to reach an agreement on how to share a pie between them. Chae and Yang (1988), Yang
(1992), Krishna and Serrano (1996) have proven that the uniqueness of perfect equilibrium can
be achieved by introducing the exit opportunity. Recent related work on n ≥ 3-person bargain-
ing game also includes Asheim (1992), Winter (1994), Merlo and Wilson (1995), Dasgupta and
Chiu (1998), Vannetelbosch (1999), Calvo-Armengo (1999), Chatterjee and Sabourian (2000),
Vidal-Puga (2004), De Fontenay and Gans (2004), Kultti and Vartiainen (2008), Santamaria
(2009), Torstensson (2009), and Yan (2009).
In this paper we study a bargaining game with n sellers and n buyers. In real world instances,
bargaining mostly occurs between sellers and buyers in exchange. When the market is not
monopolized, each buyer can freely choose among sellers to make an exchange. However,
a buyer(seller) cannot bargain with another buyer(seller). Therefore, this bargaining game is
described as below. n sellers and n buyers are about to bargain on how to share n pies. The
bargaining process is like the biding system of stock market. Each seller can either offer a
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selling price to all buyers or accept a buying price offered by any buyer. Similarly, each buyer
can either offer a buying price or accept a selling price offered by any seller. Here the price is
equivalent to the partition rate of a pie. A pair of seller and buyer will share a pie if they can
reach an agreement. Each player has a constant discounting factor, which means that the value
of pie decreases if a player cannot make an agreement with others within a period of time t. The
discounting factors and offered prices are known to all players.
We prove that this bargaining game has a bargaining equilibrium with which the bargainers
accept a unanimous price
p = (n −
n∑
i=1
δbi)/(n −
n∑
i=1
δsi).
where p is the exchange rate or price, δsi and δbi (i = 1, ..., n) are the discounting factors of the
sellers and buyers respectively.
The remainder of this paper is arranged as below. In Section 2, the preliminary knowledge
of sequential approach is introduced. The advantage of moving first can be eliminated by in-
troducing a bidding stage in which two players bid for the right to make the first offer. We also
deduce the consistency between the axiomatic approach and the sequential strategic approach.
In Section 3, we prove the bargaining equilibrium of a two-seller and two-buyer bargaining
game and extend the solution to emphn-seller and emphn-buyer case. Section 4 concludes the
paper.
1 Two-player Bargaining Game
According to Rubinstein (1982), a two-player bargaining game is described as below:
Two players, 1 and 2, are bargaining on the partition of a pie. The pie will be partitioned
only after the players reach an agreement. Each player, in turn offers a partition and his op-
ponent may agree to the offer or reject it. Acceptance of the offer ends the bargaining. After
rejection, the rejecting player then has to make a counter offer and so on. If no agreement is
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achieved, both players keep their status quo (no gain no loss).
Let X be the set of possible agreements, D the status quo (no agreement), and x1 and x2
the partitions of the pie that 1 and 2 receives respectively. The players’ preference relations are
defined on the set of ordered pairs of the type (x, t) , where t is a nonnegative integer and denotes
the time when the agreement is reached, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, x1 = x and x2 = 1 − x. Let ≻i denote player
i’s preference ordering over X ∪ {D}. There are the following assumptions.
A-1. Disagreement is the worst outcome: for every (x, t) ∈ X × T we have (x, t) ≻i D.
A-2. ’Pie’ is desirable: (x, t) ≻i (y, t) iff xi ≥ yi.
A-3. ’Time’ is valuable: for every x ∈ X, t1 < t2, if (x, t2) ≻i (d, 0) then (x, t1) ≻i (x, t2).
A-4. Stationarity: for every x, y ∈ X, ∆ > 0, if (x, t1) ≻i (y, t1 + ∆) then (x, t2) ≻i (y, t2 + ∆).
A-5. Continuity: if (x, t1) ≻i (y, t2), there always exists ǫ → 0 such that (x + ǫ, t1) ≻i (y, t2).
A-6. Increasing loss to delay: for any c1, c2 > 0, if (x + c1, t) ∼i (x, 0), (y + c2, t) ∼i (y, 0) and
xi > yi then c1 ≥ c2.
The players are with constant discounting factors: each player has a number 0 ≤ δi ≤ 1 such
that (x, t1) ≻i (y, t2) iff xiδt1i ≥ yiδt2i . Under these assumptions, Rubinstein (1982) has proven the
following proposition 1.
Proposition 1: (a) There exists a unique perfect equilibrium of this bargaining game (b) If at
least one of the δi less than 1 and at least one of them is positive, the bargaining solution is
(x, 0), where x = (1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1δ2).
Notice that player 1 is supposed to make the first offer. If player 2 makes the first move, the
solution would be x = (1−δ1)/(1−δ1δ2). The player who makes the first offer has an advantage
in bargaining and receives a larger partition of the pie than what would be received if another
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player had made the first offer.
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) gave a procedure to eliminate the advantage of
moving first as follows: let the time delay between successive periods be ∆, and represent the
discounting factor as δ∆. Then in the limit ∆ → 0, it is indifferent whoever makes the opening
demand.
lim
∆→0
x∗(∆) = lim
∆→0
y∗(∆) = xT PN (≻1,≻2)
where x∗(∆) and y∗(∆) denote the pair of agreements and xT PN (≻1,≻2) is the time preference
Nash bargaining solution.
We introduce a new procedure to eliminate the advantage of moving first as follows: two
players bid for the right to make the first offer before bargaining for the partition of the pie.
Player 1 offers a bid w (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) to player 2 to exchange the right of moving first. If player 2
accepts the bid, she receives w partition of the pie and player 1 begins the bargaining to divide
the rest 1−w; If player 2 refuses the bid, she wins the right to make the first offer to divide 1−w
and player 1 receives w. We have the following proposition 2.
Proposition 2: In the case where two players bid for the right of moving first, the unique
bargaining solution is (x, 0), where x = (1 − δ2)/(2 − δ1 − δ2).
Proof: If player 2 accepts w and player 1 makes the first move, according to Proposition 1, two
players will receive x1 and x2 respectively, where
x1 =
1 − δ2
1 − δ1δ2
(1 − w)
and x2 = 1 − x1.
On the other hand, if player 2 declines player 1’s bid, two players will receive x∗1 and x∗2,
where
x∗1 = w +
δ1(1 − δ2)
1 − δ1δ2
(1 − w)
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and x∗2 = 1 − x∗1.
It is obvious that there should be x1 = x∗1. Then we have
w =
(1 − δ1)(1 − δ2)
2 − δ1 − δ2
x1 =
1 − δ2
2 − δ1 − δ2
x2 =
1 − δ1
2 − δ1 − δ2

With the bidding procedure, the bargaining equilibrium remains fixed no matter which
player makes the first offer and it is indifferent for each player to make an offer or to accept
the opponent’s offer. If we regard player 1 as the seller and player 2 the buyer, p = x1/x2 =
(1 − δ2)/(1 − δ1) can be treated as the price of exchange. Specifically, two players share the pie
equally when δ1 = δ2 or p = 1. Player 2 receives the whole pie when p = 0. Player 1 receives
the whole pie when p = ∞. Proposition 2 also shows the consistency between the strategic
bargaining approach and the Nash bargaining solution. Let u1 and u2 be the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utilities of two players. If we define
pN =
1 − δ2
1 − δ1
= arg max (u1(p)u2(p)) (1)
the outcome of Proposition 2 is exactly Nash bargaining solution.
2 A N-seller and N-buyer Bargaining Game
Consider a market where there are only two goods, A and B. Participants in this market negotiate
to exchange A for B or to exchange B for A. Without loss of generality, let’s assume that those
who want to exchange A for B are the sellers and those who want to exchange B for A are the
buyers. The price p is then the exchange ratio of the amount of B to A and it is the only factor
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that every player cares for in the bargaining. Each seller prefers a higher price and each buyer
prefers a lower price. The assumptions here are A-1 to A-3 and that each player can freely
choose their bargaining partner. The bargaining game is described as below.
A group of players that contains n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies
(each pie is of size of 1). A seller (/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the
division of a pie. Each player has a constant discounting factor and their discounting factors are
known to all players(δsi and δbi for the sellers and buyers respectively, i = 1, ..., n, 0 < δsi < 1,
0 < δbi < 1). The players bargain in a system like the stock market: each seller(buyer) can
either offer a selling(buying) price to all buyers(sellers) or accept a price offered by another
buyer(seller). The offered prices are known to all. Once a player accepts a price offered by
another player, the division of a pie between them is determined and both players quit the
bargaining. The players who do not make any agreement with others remain to the next round
and this process will continue until no further agreements are possible or the value of pies
decrease to zero.
When an agreement is made, which side offers the price (and which side accepts it) is not
important since both sides only care for the price of the agreement. In order to simplify the
analysis, we assume that the bargaining process in each round is as follows. The sellers first
offer their selling prices. The buyers choose whether or not to accept them. If a buyer does not
accept any selling offer, he/she has to offer a buying price. And then the sellers who do not have
an agreement choose whether or not to accept a buying price. A round of bargaining ends. The
players who do not have an agreement with others enter the next round of bargaining.
We first analyze the bargaining problem of two sellers and two buyers and then extend it to
the case of n sellers and n buyers.
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2.1 A two-seller and two-buyer bargaining game
Consider the bargaining problem of two sellers S 1 and S 2 and two buyers B1 and B2 whose
discounting factors are δs1, δs2, δb1 and δb2 respectively. Let F be the set of all strategies of the
players who offer the partitions, and G the set of all strategies of the players who have to respond
to an offer. The outcome of this bargaining can be expressed by the quad (x1, t1, x2, t2) where
x1, x2 ∈ X denote the partitions of two pies that two pairs of players agree with respectively,
t1, t2 denote the time when the agreements are made. Notice that t → ∞ denotes ’disagreement’
between a seller and a buyer. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3: A two-seller and two-buyer bargaining game has a bargaining equilibrium, a
unanimous partition of both pies.
Proof: We first prove that, if there exists a bargaining equilibrium, it must be a unanimous
partition of two pies (unanimous partition is a necessary condition).
Without loss of generality, suppose that the seller S 1 and the buyer B1 reach the agreement
of partition (x1, t1) and S 2 and B2 reach the agreement of partition (x2, t2). For the outcome
(x1, t1, x2, t2) to be a perfect equilibrium partition, there must be x1 = x2 and t1 = t2.
If x1 , x2, without loss of generality, let’s assume x1 > x2.
(1) If t1 > t2, B1 could offer a buying partition x′ (x2 < x′ < x1) at time t2 and S 2 would
accept the offer instead of x1 so that both players improved their payoffs. Thus, (x1, t1, x2, t2) is
not an equilibrium.
(2) If t1 < t2, S 2 could offer a selling partition x′ (x2 < x′ < x1) at time t1 and B1 would
accept it so that both players improved their payoffs. So (x1, t1, x2, t2) is not an equilibrium.
(3) If t1 = t2, either B1 or S 2 would offer a partition x′ (x2 < x′ < x1) to improve their
payoffs.
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Whenever there are x1 , x2, we can always find a pair of seller and buyer who can be better
off by making a deal with new partition x′ (x2 < x′ < x1). Thus the equilibrium must be a
unanimous partition of two pies.
Second, we prove that no player has incentive to deviate from a unanimous partition uni-
laterally (unanimous partition is a sufficient condition). Given that four players have reached a
unanimous partition, in which the partition is x between each pair of seller and buyer. A seller
would deviate only if there was a buyer who would accept a higher price than x. A buyer would
deviate only if there was a seller who would accept a lower price than x. Obviously, two con-
ditions are conflict with each other. Thus no player could deviate from a unanimous partition
unilaterally.

Every player will receive the minimum payoff if they cannot reach a unanimous partition.
Realising that they have to reach a unanimous partition, the sellers and buyers actually bargain
on a price with which no single player can be better off by deviating from it. Both sellers
prefer higher prices to lower prices while both buyers prefer lower prices to higher prices. The
bargaining game turns out to be a two-player game, in which one side is the group of sellers and
the other side is the group of buyers. According to Proposition 1, there is a unique equilibrium
of the two-player bargaining game. Let x∗ denote the partition in this equilibrium. In order to
determine x∗ by adopting a sequential approach, we assume that the sellers first offer a partition
to the buyers. If the buyers accept it, two agreements are made and the game ends. Otherwise,
the buyers make a counter offer on the discounted pie. The game continues until either two
agreements or disagreement is made.
Following Rubinstein (1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990), we define a group of
9
functions vi (i = s1, s2, b1, b2) as follows.
vi(x, t) =
{
y, ∃y ∈ X such that (y, 0) ∼i (x, t)
0, ∀y ∈ X there is (y, 0) ≻i (x, t)
This means that for any (x, t), either there is a unique y ∈ X such that player i is indifferent
between (x, t) and (y, 0), or every (y, 0) is preferred by i to (x, t). In order for two sellers and two
buyers to reach a unanimous partition, there should be vs1 = vs2 and vb1 = vb2 . This means that
two sellers (buyers) are equal in the bargaining no matter what values their discounting factors
are.
In order for two sellers (buyers) to form the same bargaining strategy, there should be
vs1(x, t) = vs2(x, t) =
1
2
(δts1 + δts2)x (2)
vb1(x, t) = vb2(x, t) =
1
2
(δtb1 + δtb2)x (3)
The intersection of ys1 = v1(xs1 , 1) and xb1 = v1(yb1 , 1) reflects the unanimous partition (x∗, y∗).
This can be expressed as Fig.1.
From Fig.1, we have
x∗ =
2(2 − δb1 − δb2)
4 − (δb1 + δb2)(δs1 + δs2) (4)
y∗ =
(δb1 + δb2)(2 − δs1 − δs2)
4 − (δb1 + δb2)(δs1 + δs2) (5)
When the sellers and buyers bid for the right of making the first offer, the advantage of first offer
can be eliminated. The process is that the sellers first offers a bid w (0 ≤ w ≤ 1) to the buyers to
exchange the right of first offer. If the buyers accept the bid, each buyer receives w partition of
a pie and the sellers begin the bargaining to divide the rest of pies; If the buyers refuse the bid,
they win the right to make an offer first and each seller receives w.
If the buyers accept the bid, each seller will receive
x1 =
2(2 − δb1 − δb2)
4 − (δs1 + δs2)(δb1 + δb2)(1 − w)
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Figure 1: Perfect equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for the bargaining game of two-pair of sellers and buyers.
If the buyers incline the bid, each seller will receive
x2 =
(δs1 + δs2)(2 − δb1 − δb2)
4 − (δs1 + δs2)(δb1 + δb2)(1 − w) + w
Obviously, there should be x1 = x2. Then we have
x1 =
2 − δb1 − δb2
4 − δb1 − δb2 − δs1 − δs2
(6)
Each buyer receives
y1 = 1 − x1 =
2 − δs1 − δs2
4 − δb1 − δb2 − δs1 − δs2
(7)
Hence,
p = x1/y1 =
2 − δb1 − δb2
2 − δs1 − δs2
(8)
According to Proposition 3, a patient player receives the same price as an impatient player in
the bargaining. This counterintuitive-seeming result can be explained as below. Because every
player would like to choose the impatient player to be their bargaining opponent, the impatient
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player could increase their share by threatening to change their bargaining opponent. Simi-
larly, the patient player had to lower their share because of their opponent’s threat of changing
their bargaining opponent. Consequently, a unanimous price will be reached so that the sellers
(buyers) receive equal partition no matter how patient or impatient they are.
Figure 2: Relationship between two-player bargaining and two-pair of players bargaining.
Fig.2 shows the relationship between the two-player bargaining equilibrium and the two-
seller and two-buyer bargaining equilibrium. If the players bargain with each other indepen-
dently, the equilibrium of two players bargaining will be either A,C or B, D. When they bargain
together, the equilibrium will be (x∗, y∗), which is a point inside the quadrilateral ABCD.
2.2 The n-seller and n-buyer bargaining game
Let S i and Bi (i = 1, · · · , n) denote the sellers and buyers respectively, and δsi and δbi the
discounting factors of the sellers and buyers respectively. We have Proposition 4 as below.
Proposition 4: The n-seller and n-buyer bargaining problem has an equilibrium: a unanimous
price pn,
pn = (n −
n∑
i=1
δbi)/(n −
n∑
i=1
δsi) (9)
Proof: According to the proof of Proposition 3, a bargaining equilibrium for this bargaining
game must be a unanimous price. It is easy to verify that, if there are different prices, at least
one pair of seller and buyer can be better off by changing their decisions.
Consider the two largest coalitions that contains all sellers and buyers respectively. Let
p∗ denotes the price determined by these two coalitions. p∗ must be an equilibrium because
no player can be better off by leaving their coalition. For example, a seller would leave the
coalition only if there was a buyer who would accept p > p∗. However, any buyer would leave
their coalition only if there was p < p∗. Let δsA and δbA be the average discounting factor of the
coalitions of sellers and buyers respectively.
δsA = (δs1 + δs2 + · · · + δsn)/n (10)
δbA = (δb1 + δb2 + · · · + δbn)/n (11)
According to (1), there must be
p∗ =
1 − δbA
1 − δsA
=
n −
∑n
i=1 δbi
n −
∑n
i=1 δsi
.
Then, p∗ is the unanimous price p∗ = pn.

The equilibrium of the n-seller and n-buyer bargaining game can be expressed as Fig.3. Two
coalitions reach the agreement of (x∗, y∗). If two coalitions bid for the right to make the first
offer, the advantage of making the first offer will be removed. Then, each seller receives x1,
x1 =
n −
∑n
i=1 δbi
2n −
∑n
i=1(δsi + δbi)
(12)
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Each buyer receives y1,
y1 =
n −
∑n
i=1 δsi
2n −
∑n
i=1(δsi + δbi)
(13)
Figure 3: Perfect equilibrium (x∗, y∗) for the bargaining game of n-pair of sellers and buyers.
Imagine that there exists a pair of representative seller and buyer, S A and BA, whose dis-
counting factors, δsA and δbA , are the average of discounting factors of all sellers and all buyers
respectively. The equilibrium of a n-pair players bargaining game is equivalent to the equilib-
rium of two representative players bargaining game. Let usA(p) and ubA(p) be the von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions of the representative seller and buyer respectively. If we define
pN =
n −
∑n
i=1 δbi
n −
∑n
i=1 δsi
= arg max (usA(p)ubA(p)),
the outcome of Proposition 4 is consistent with Nash bargaining equilibrium.
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3 Conclusions
The bargaining games of two-seller and two-buyer, and further n-seller and n-buyer are analyzed
by using a sequential approach. The equilibria of these bargaining games are unanimous prices
determined by average discounting factors of all sellers and all buyers. Every player is a price
taker when n is large because individual player has trivial power to determine the bargaining
price. This conclusion has the potential of being extended to the problems of market-clearing
prices in perfectly competitive markets.
In this study, the 2n players are assumed to bargain together so that the bargaining problem
can be considered as a game with complete information in which each player knows the dis-
counting factors of all players. This may be unrealistic in real world market, especially when
the number of players is relatively large. It sometimes takes time, money, and other resources
for the players to retrieve certain information. If the cost of information is taken into consider-
ation, the players will have to restrict their negotiations within a limited group of players. Then
the propagation of information will have an influence on the players’ strategies and different
prices are possible in this circumstance.
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